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times, and that the observations 
of 2000 years ago deviate very 
little from the basic medical con­
cepts we hold today. Study of the 
Bible reveals an extraordinary con­
cordance between data of the 
Scriptures and many of the mod-
em and most recent di� 
in the biological and medic 
To quote Sir Isaac Newto 
Scriptures are the most 
philosophy. I find more , 
authenticity in the Bible 
profane history anywhere 
veries 
fields. 
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number of topics. 
A SURVEY c o nducted  a m o n gsome hundred English and 
Welsh physicians a few years ago 
revealed a marked difference of 
opinion regarding the practical 
obligations of medical secrecy.1
The questionnaire submitted to 
these doctors took the form of a 
series of imaginary cases in which 
either the common good or the 
rights of individuals seemed to 
argue in favor of a doctor's di­
vulging certain information ac­
quired in the course of his pro­
fessional practice. The doctors 
were asked to express their per­
sonal opinions as to proper pro­
cedure in each instance. whether 
to disclose or to withhold the in­
formation in question. 
Some of the problems posed are 
quite provocative - and perhaps 
the divergence of opinions ex­
pressed would be considered even 
more so. If a physician, for ex­
ample, as a private practitioner, 
should discover that a railroad en­
gineer, whom he has diagnosed as 
epileptic, intends neither to inform 
his employers of his condition nor 
to give up his work, should the 
doctor himself report the case to 
railway authorities? Answers were 
� "Du ed by E. C. Dawson, M.R.C.S .. ties of A Doctor as A Citizen," 
�
8
· Medical Journal, 4902:' 1474-
(Dec. 18) 1954. 
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almost seven to one in favor of 
divulging the information. Should 
the doctor report to the police the 
identity of a criminal abortionist, 
whose name he has learned from 
a woman patient who forbids him 
to make use of the knowledge? A 
slight majority favored reporting 
the culprit, while a strong minor­
ity declared for the contrary. A 
workman is receiving industrial 
insurance compensation for an in­
jury alleged to have been received 
in the course of his work. Would 
his personal physician be justified 
in revealing to authorities that the 
disability was actually incurred 
prior to his employment and that 
the claim is therefore fraudulent? 
By approximately two to one, the 
doctors decided against the pro­
priety of revealing this medical 
information. 
The results of such a poll might 
easily provoke doctors to any one 
of several adverse reactions -
either consternation at the number 
who would countenance an ap­
parent breach of professional eth­
ics in certain situations; or impa­
tience with the insistence of some 
on the absolute sacredness of the 
medical secret regardless of all 
circumstances; or chagrin at the 
failure of doctors to agree on so 
basic a question; or perhaps re­
sentment towards medical soci-
9 
eties whose stringent ethical codes 
seem to create the dilemmas which 
occasion such uncertaint ies.  
Which, if any, is the proper re­
action in the light of sound moral 
principles? 
In its ultimate refinements, the 
moral question of professional 
secrecy is complex to the extreme, 
and does not lend itself easily to 
exhaustive treatment within the 
limits of a single article.2 But 
there is a certain minimum of ba­
sic principles which can be stated 
more or less briefly and which 
may serve to remove at least the 
major doubts which are likely to 
occur in this regard. So, in the 
interests of practicality, these are 
the principal points upon which 
solution will depend when prob­
lems of medical secrecy present 
themselves: 
1) The doctor's obligation of 
medical secrecy is a serious duty 
arising from the natural-law right 
of both patient and society; 
2) The obligation as derived
from natural law is not entirely 
absolute, but admits of some ex­
ceptions in accordance with the 
rights of both patient and society; 
3 ) These exceptions are rela­
tively rare, and usually at least 
the common good will require that 
a doctor maintain silence with re­
gard to secret knowledge ac­
quired of his patients in the course 
of professional practice. 
� For an excellent and fully detailed 
treatment of professional secrecy, in­
cluding specific applications to the obli­
g_ation of doctors, see Robert E. Regan, 
O.S.A., The Moral Pr in ciples Govern­
ing P rofessional Secrecy with an ln­
quir9 into Some of the More Important 
Pmfessional S e c r et s (Washington: 
.
, Catholic University of America, 1941). 
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NATURE OF SECREC'1 N 
GENERAL 
Apart from all technic. :ies. it 
is clear that much of \ at we 
know - especially knO\V, :ge of 
our own deficiencies in tl physi­
cal or moral order - is 01 highly 
personal and private na ce and 
not the sort of informati, . which 
we would care to sh � with 
others. Fortunately nc all of 
those facts are external appar­
ent to others; the eviden< is mer­
cifully concealed to evet one but 
ourselves. For if other, were to 
discover our secret, it co • d cause 
us notable displeasure, d :omlort, 
embarrassment, or perb ps even 
misfortune of a more c lamitous 
nature. Hence we take pains to 
conceal from others in lfmation 
which we consider to be 10 one's 
business but our own; a· I we re­
sent those who pry int( our pri­
vate affairs for the satis 1ction of 
their own curiosity. V. ,ether it 
be the size of his bank . count or 
the nature of his secre' sins. the 
contents of his diary or his med­
ical case history, the or� i nary in­
dividual is extremely j alous of 
his monopoly on certa1,1 knowl­
edge which he regards as being 
exclusively his. In otha words. 
one's right to his own secrets is 
universally recognized and de­
fended as part of our natural her­
itage. 
It is that commonly accepted 
concept which the theologians at­
tempt to delineate even more pre­
cisely when they define secrets in 
general as any hidden knowledge. 
pertaining to a person by strrct 
right, which others may not la�­
fully seek to possess, use, or dis­
pose of (i.e., reveal} contrary to 
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the reasonable will of the owner. 
They. too, consider a secret to be 
the property of its owner in the 
very same sense in which material 
possessions belong exclusively to 
this or that individual. Conse­
quently only the owner of a secret 
has the right to possess. to use, or 
to share it with whom he may. 
For others to usurp that exclusive 
right is a form of injustice equiva­
lent to theft. the seriousness of 
which must be estimated in pro­
portion to the harm which is fore­
seen as consequent upon that in­
justice. 
Granted therefore the occult 
nature of certain information, an 
exclusive title to it on the part of 
a particular individual, and the 
individual's reasonable unwilling­
ness to share it with others, there 
arises from natural law an obliga­
tion on the part of all others to 
respect that right just as conscien­
tiously as they should respect the 
right of private property. If, con­
trary to another's reasonable will, 
We pry into his secret knowledge 
or impart it to others or make un­
authorized use of it in any way 
!@. his disadvantage, we do him an
lllJustice just as surely as though 
We had appropriated his material 
Possessions. 
PROFESSIONAL SECRECY 
this 
The professional secret is all 
. and considerably more, en­
tailing as it does additional obli-
91tions even more serious than 
tliose already predicated of se­
�ts in general. Respect for the 
limple" secret ( the term is used 
la contradistinction to the more 
COmplex professional secret) is re-
4111ired primarily by commutative
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justice, i.e., by the rights of the 
individual whose exclusive posses­
sion the information is and to 
whose personal detriment viola­
tion of that right would tend. 
Professional secrecy is demanded 
also by legal justice, i.e., by the 
common good which is at very 
least endangered, if not actually 
damaged, by every violation of 
professional trust. It is that inev­
itable relationship to the common 
good of society which marks the 
essential feature of the profes­
sional secret and reveals its espe­
cially sacred character. 
This relationship arises from 
the fact that certain professions, 
altogether indispensable to soci­
ety, are of their very nature fidu­
ciary. i.e., they necessarily deal 
with the secrets of clients. The 
medical profession, for example, 
which is unquestionably essential 
to the good health of any com­
munity. depends to a large extent 
for its effectiveness on the willing­
ness of patients to make available 
to their doctors a good deal of in­
formation of a secret nature. Be­
cause of the necessity of procur­
ing proper medical care. patients 
have no choice but to entrust their 
physicians with knowledge about 
themselves which otherwise they 
would not dream of divulging. 
They do so on the implicit under­
standing that their secrets are en­
tirely safe with doctors and that 
their confidence as patients will in 
no way be used to their disad­
vantage. They do not relinquish 
their right to secrecy, but perforce 
allow the doctor to share in the 
possession of knowledge over 
which they alone retain the right 
of any further disclosure. 
11 
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Now let us suppose an outright 
breach of medical secrecy on the 
part of a physician. What harm 
would thereby be done? There 
would be, of course, a personal 
injustice to the individual patient, 
as would be true in any violation 
of secrecy. But over and above 
this personal injustice, a blow 
would also be struck against the 
integrity of the profession as a 
whole and consequently against 
its future effectiveness for the 
common good. To function at 
i d e a  I maximum efficiency. the 
medical profession simply must 
command the respect and esteem 
of the public and maintain that 
tradition of unquestioned trust­
worthiness which invites the con­
fidences of individual patients. 
Conduct which belies that reputa­
tion cannot fail to have deleterious 
effects on the profession's poten­
tial worth as a service to human­
ity. It is for this social purpose 
that medical codes of ethics are 
primarily devised. Their principal 
aim is to protect the integrity of 
the profession as such, that the 
public good may be adequately 
served. Professional misconduct, 
therefore, becomes reprehensible 
not only as an offense against the 
individual patient but also as a 
form of perfidy against both the 
profession and the community. 
Such are the several implic�­
tions intended by theologians 
when they describe medical se­
crecy as a special obligation, bind­
ing doctors in both commutative 
and legal justice, of maintaining a 
discreet silence with reference to 
the confidential communications 
made _to them in the course of 
"12 
their practice. The basic 
tion of the medical secre. 
in no way from the oblig 
secrecy in general, and f01 
physician to use or to re 
patients' secrets contrary 
reasonable wishes. The � 
the obligation, however, 
fold: commutative justic 
determines the doctor's d1. 
individual patients; and l, 
tice, which fixes his resp, 
to the medical professio· 
the public at large. 
bliga­
!iffers 
·on of 
ds the 
a l  his 
, their 
rce of 
two­
which 
to his 
al jus­
sibility 
and to 
No member of the mec al pro­
fession, when he fun. ins as 
such, can possibly escap- •his re­
sponsibility to the indiv 1al and 
to the common good. It simply 
inseparable from his offi, as phy­
sician, and made so b natural 
law. It is implicit in the cit con­
tract upon which he er rs with 
his patient when he und :akes to 
act in the latter's bE: lf. and 
would be so even inde �ndently 
of any humanly contrive. code of 
ethics. While .it is true · at every 
medical code from thf. time of 
Hippocrates has recog1 zed and 
sanctioned his rule of p•· fessional 
secrecy, the fundament ,] obliga­
tion in no way depends upon hu­
man legislation. We do well to 
reaffirm and specify it by positive 
precept, just as the Church has 
often declared other duties of nat• 
ural law. But in the last analysis 
we must face the fact that the 
medical secret is sacred not by 
mere c o n v e n t i o n  or arbitrary 
agreement among honorable men, 
but by virtue of that universal and 
immutable law of which none less 
than God is the author. 
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A LIMITED OBLIGATION 
On the basis of this concept of 
medical secrecy, the obligation it 
entails is to some extent limited 
and not absolute, and may be ex­
pressed in such terms as these: 
the physician is obliged to protect 
his patient's secret as long as the 
patient retains the right to secrecy
and remains reasonably unwilling 
that its content be divulged, or as 
. long as the common good, even 
independently of the p a t  i e n  t 's
right, requires that secrecy be ob­
served. 
This principle a.ffirms the right 
of both patient and society to re­
quire secrecy of doctors. And, 
with the consistency of logic itself, 
it also ·implies that if neither the 
patient's right nor the common 
good should demand secrecy in a 
given ipstance, the obligation in 
that particular case is simply non­
existent. Perhaps the easiest way 
to explain the exceptions implicit 
in the general rule would be to 
consider some of the situations in 
which revelation of a medical se­
cret could be regarded as com­
patible with both the patient's 
rights and the good of society. 
I) Consent of the Patient 
a) Explicit Consent
To begin with the most obvious, 
it is clear that the patient himself, 
as proprietor of his own secret, 
may authorize its disclosure to 
whomsoever he pleases. Though 
still in possession of his right to 
secrecy, he may simply prefer not 
to exercise it absolutely but to ad­
lllit certain others to a share in his 
knowledge. In the event of ex­
plicit authorization of this sort, it 
is hardly necessary to state that 
F!BRUARY, 1962 
no injustice to the patient is done 
by revealing the information in 
question, provided that only as 
much is divulged as has been au­
thorized and only to the parties 
designated. The patient's request. 
for example, that the doctor re­
lease to an insurance company 
whatever part of his medical rec­
ord be necessary for adjustment 
of claims, limits both the. recipient 
of the information and the amount 
to be divulged. 
Does the common good make 
any demands of the doctor in 
cases of this kind? It does, at 
least to the extent of requiring 
caution lest a wrong impression 
be given when· divulging informa­
tion even with the consent of the 
patient. Especially when dealing 
with laymen, a doctor would be 
wise to let the fact of authoriza­
tion be known to those to whom 
he must disclose his patient's se­
crets. Otherwise there can be 
danger of creating suspicion that 
medical confidences are being vio­
lated. even when actually they 
are not, with resultant discredit 
to the individual doctor and to the 
profession itself. 
( For much the same reason, in­
cidentally, doctors should avoid if 
possible discussing even the non­
secret affairs of their patients, i.e., 
facts about them which may be 
common knowledge, but which a 
physician might also know in a 
professional capacity. Everyone in 
the neighborhood may know, for 
instance, about the birth of an il­
legitimate child. But to have that 
knowledge confirmed by the at­
tending obstetrician woud not be 
the sort of conduct which does 
credit to the medical profession.) 
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b) P. esumed Consent 
It cannot be denied that cir­
cumstances can arise in which the 
patient's willingness to admit cer­
tain others to his secrets may be 
legitimately presumed. If for any 
reason it is impossible to contact 
the patient in circumstances which 
seem to demand some disclosure 
of professional knowledge, and if 
it can be prudently judged that 
authorization would be readily 
granted if the request could be 
made, then presumption of con­
sent could be in order. Certainly, 
for example, no doctor would hes­
itate to call medical consultants 
into a case in which an unknown 
patient is unconscious and consul­
tation advisable. And because it 
is only reasonable to suppose that 
patients are concerned for their 
spiritual welfare, it is also a safe 
presumption that they are not un­
willing that the chaplain be sup­
plied with whatever information 
may be necessary to his proper 
function in their regard. 
Perhaps a practical test for the 
validity of such a presumption 
would be some such question as 
this: is disclosure of this informa­
tion so obviously to the patient's 
benefit that he would readily au­
thorize it if he were able? But 
unless that question can be an­
swered with prudent assurance in 
the affirmative, presumption of 
consent in this matter can be risky 
business and should be restricted 
to that absolute minimum which 
only real necessity requires. 
2) Cessation of the 
Patient's Right 
When we speak in terms of the 
right to complete secrecy, we im­
..,14 
ply that one is justified in ,elud­
ing all others from any :ire in 
secret. 
others 
.ire le­
vledge 
·al se­
d that 
ightful 
the knowledge he claims 11 
Now it can happen tha 
besides the patient can ac 
gitimate title to the kr 
which comprises the me 
cret, and can justly den 
they be allowed their 
share in that knowledg 
can happen that some 
moral duty of the patien 
himself may require at 
tial revelation of his 
either possibility shoulc 
ate ( and how it might 
will be illustrated shor 
clear that no injustice i 
patient if a secret, whi 
science he should sl 
others, is actually con 
to those legitimate clairr 
Or it 
g h e r  
owards 
st par­
ret. If 
eventu­
entuate 
) , it is 
one the 
in con­
e with 
unicated 
ts. That 
is why the doctor's obi, tion was 
conditioned previously vith the 
proviso, "as long as P.atient 
retains his right to sec, ·,'. 
However, even tho ,h there 
may be others to who.1 · medical 
secret should be divul, ·. it does 
not immediately folio: chat the 
physician should be one to 
make the disclosure. � �iety and 
his profession also h, further 
claims on his silence. ; or unless 
we restrict to the ba1 .t possible 
minimum even those lisclosures 
which do no violence k the rights 
of individual patient:;. inevitably 
there will result a dan1<1ging loss 
of public confidence in .:rnd respect 
for the essential inviolability of 
professional trust. Primarily for 
that reason, the common good will 
usually require that the doctor 
maintain secrecy evell after the 
patient's strict right may have 
lapsed. And that is the reason. 
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too, for including within our gen­
eral principle the phrase, "as long 
as the common good, even inde­
pendently of the patient's right, 
requires that s e c r e c y be ob­
served." Translated into medical 
terminology. it means that dis­
:losure of professional knowledge 
should be for the doctor a pro­
cedure of last resort. 
But to return to cases, what 
circumstances could deprive the 
patient of his personal right to 
complete secrecy? The generic an­
swer is "conflict"; more specifically. 
conflict either with a higher obli­
gation on his own part or with a 
predominant right on the part of 
others. The following break-down 
of possibilities perhaps will serve 
to illustrate the type of limitation 
which must be put on the patient's 
right to_ complete secrecy. 
a) Conflicting Obligation 
- of the Patient 
There are times when a pa­
tient's refusal to allow medical se­
crets to be divulged to certain 
others will do him more harm than 
good, and when insistence on se­
crecy may appear to conflict with 
�ore important rights and obliga­
tions of his own. It may happen, 
f?r example, that if a needy pa­
tient would only inform a wealthy 
relative of his need of some ex­
pensive treatment, death might be 
averted. Still the patient refuses 
to reveal his plight, and the doc­
tor may wonder whether for the 
atubbor:i one's own good he him­
self should contact the relative in 
question. 
L,
�'As long as the patient retains
111S right to secrecy, the doctor 
llust respect that right." And 
FEBRUARY, 1962 
from the sole fact that his secret 
will do him more physical harm 
�han good, it does not necessarily 
follow that the right of secrecy 
lapses. Only if the harm which
would result is one which he is 
obliged to avert even at some sac­
rffice of secrecy. will his right to
tt,at degree of privacy be nullified. 
What appears to be, according to
human standards, "the sensible 
thing to do" is not always of ob­
ligation. 
13ut take for example the fallen­
away Catholic who is in serious 
danger of death from some ail­
ment not apparent to the unpro­
fessional eye and who has falsi­
fied his religion upon admission to 
the hospital. He forbids the doc­
tor to inform the Catholic chap­
lain either of his physical condi­
tion or of his religious status. 
Clearly this insistence on the right 
to secrecy is unfounded, since it
is in direct conflict with the pa­
tient's higher right and obligation 
to save his soul. Actually he does 
not possess the right to that de­
gree of screcy, if the revelation 
of those two facts represents his 
only practical chance for salvation. 
Certainly in this extreme case no 
right of the patient is violated if 
this professional knowledge is 
made available to the chaplain; 
and, if it is not likely that the lat­
ter will acquire the information 
elsewhere, the doctor would be 
justified in supplying it. 
Perhaps the example is so 
strained as to appear worthless. 
The choice was deliberate because 
of a personal conviction that in a 
conflict of this kind it is seldom 
easy t o  decide with certainty that 
the right to secrecy must yield . 
15 
Even more seldom would it be the 
prerogative of the doctor to solve 
such doubts contrary to the pa­
tient's own decision. The case cited 
above is, I think, clearly one on 
which right to secrecy must yield; 
but it is one of comparatively few. 
b) Conflicting Rights of the
Doctor 
Even in the face of his obligation 
to respect the medical secret as 
being the propi>rty of another. the 
physician himself possesses certain 
inviolable rights to reputation and 
to the pursuit of his material and 
spiritual welfare. To what extent 
must he sacrifice any of these 
rights in order to protect a medical 
secret? Or is he justified in pro­
tecting his own legitimate interests 
even at the cost, if necessary, of 
revealing c e r t a  i n professional 
knowledge? 
In at least one such contingency, 
it is clear that it is the patient's 
right which yields and the doctor's 
which prevails. The case is one in 
which the medical secret is abused 
by being deliberately employed as 
a weapon of unjust aggression 
against the doctor himself. Instead 
of employing his doctor's silence 
as a means of protecting his own 
legitimate interests ( the only pur­
pose for which the right to secrecy 
is granted him), the patient now 
threatens to make use of that sic 
lence in an unjust invasion of the 
physician's rights, 
Suppose, for example, that a pa­
tient were maliciously to bring un­
warranted suit for malpractice 
against an innocent physician. The 
latter's only defense, we can fur­
ther· suppose. against fi:iancial loss 
1'6 
and defamation of charaw: 
testimony of his medical re 
the case. According to t 
ciple of legi t imate  self 
against unjust a g gress1 
plaintiff has sacrificed his 
secrecy by making it an in 
of injustice, and the doc 
in proportion to the gravi 
danger which threatens h. 
whatever use of prof1 
knowledge may be truly r 
to defend himself. 
,s the 
:ds of 
prin-
Jense 
,. the 
ght to 
ument 
may. 
of the 
make 
ional 
essary 
simply Legally the case is mo 
solved. Unless I am mis• 
plaintiff would be allower 
gate such a suit unless h 
the right to secrecy in wl 
tutes pertinent evidence. 
solution is again based o . 
of the patient. But the m 
lkatioii of such a legal , 
be found in this princir 
right to defend oneself a· 
just attack. 
1,en, no 
J insti­
waived 
consti­
hus the 
..:onsent 
11 justi­
mg can 
of the 
inst un-
Theoretically it may al happen 
that through no fault of , , · patient 
the medical secret becou s a sen­
ous threat to the doc . , r. The 
classic example is that o a doctor 
who is himself accused , i a crime 
which from professional howledge 
he knows was committ,·d by his 
patient. The latter, acrording to 
the further supposition is in no 
way responsible for suspicion hav­
ing fallen on the innocent doctor. 
and hence cannot be classified as 
an unjust aggressor in his regard. 
Such a contingency, though pos­
sible, does not seem to be a highly 
pract ica l  p r o b a b i l i ty. Perhaps. 
however, a case in point is created 
by the failure of our common Jaw 
to recognize in court the privileged 
nature of the medical secret. Sup-
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pose, for example, that a civil court 
should subpoena a physician to 
testify from his records against a 
criminal abortionist. Say what we 
may about the defectiveness of a 
civil law which creates such dilem­
mas, th� fact remains that, justly 
or unjustly, the doctor could be 
prosecuted in many of our states 
and severly penalized for refusal 
so to testify. Must he in conscience 
submit to such a penalty rather 
than reveal p rofessional knowl­
edge? 
On condition that the danger 
threatening him can be appraised 
as truly serious, and that the doc­
tor can avoid it in no other practi­
cal way, his testimony from the 
medical record would be morally 
permissible. ·He should have the 
court record show that he considers 
his knowledge privileged; and he 
should conceal, if possible, the 
identity of the patient. Beyond that 
point he is not obliged to go. The 
reasons in order are these: I ) the 
doctor-patient contract cannot be 
said to be undertaken with intent 
to bind even with serious harm to 
the physician, and hence does not 
certainly oblige from justice at that 
cost to him; 2 ) charity does not 
require that one protect another at 
the serious risk of equivalently the 
same harm to self; 3) since in the 
circumstances it should be clear to 
all that the doctor testifies only 
under protest and because of the 
alleged req�irements of the com­
mon good, neither his own reputa­
tion nor that of the profession 
should reasonably suffer in public 
'8timation. 
The solution is not an ideal one, 
c:hie8y because the anomaly of our 
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civil law makes ideal sdution im­
possible. But perhaps it may pro­
vide some measure of assurance 
for doctors who must face the di­
lemma. 
c) Conflicting Rights of Others
We have said that a doctor is 
sometimes justified ( at the sacri­
fice of secrecy, if necessary), in 
protecting himself against a pa­
tient's misuse of the secret as a 
weapon of unjust aggression. So, 
too, he may at times protect other 
individuals or society as such in 
the same way. What we may le­
gitimately do for ourselves in this 
regard we may in charity do for 
others. 
The traditional example cited in 
this connection is that of the pa­
tient with a contagious and not 
readily curable disease who is con­
templating marriage and who re­
fuses to inform his fiancee of his 
physical condition. Clearly the pa­
tient is not justified in concealing 
the fact from his wife-to-be, and 
his silence is a serious threat to 
her physical welfare. May the 
physician make the information 
available to her? 
He should first make all reason­
able effort to persuade the patient 
either to postpone the marriage 
until cured or to inform his fiancee 
of his condition. Failing that, he 
would be justified in communicat­
ing that professional knowledge to 
the one interested party, if there is 
no likelihood that she would ac­
quire the information from some 
other source or otherwise be pro­
tected from the danger which 
threatens her. 
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d) Conflicting Rights of Society
What can be said about the
conflicting rights of other individ­
uals applies a fortiori to the rights 
of society. This conflict is well 
illustrated by one of the cases in­
cluded in the survey referred to at 
the beginning of this discussion­
that of the epileptic engineer. In 
refusing either to quit his work or 
to inform railway officials of his 
incapacity. this patient is using 
secrecy unjust ly  as a weapon 
against the public at large. The 
common good demands protection 
against his unjust aggression. If 
the only practical means of provid­
ing that protection is revelation of 
professional knowledge, the doctor 
is within his moral rights in dis­
closing the dangerous fact to the 
proper authority. On the very 
same principle we would justify 
without hesitation the reporting of 
contagious diseases to the extent 
necessary to insure proper quaran­
tine. 
It is when the common good is 
seri_ously imperilled in this way 
that release from the obligation is 
least difficult, though still far from 
easy. to vindicate. The reason is 
that if the common good would 
suffer notably more from secrecy 
than it would from disclosure, so­
ciety is considered as preferring 
the lesser evil and as thereby waiv­
ing the claim which in legal justice 
it has to the preservation of secre­
cy. In all other cases, however, 
that perennial claim of the common 
good argues more strongly against 
any disclosure of professional 
knowledge. 
RIGHT VS. OBLIGATION 
Besides the problem of the right 
to divulge medical secrets, mora-
(g 
lists also consider the qm _ion of 
obligation at times to mak such a 
disclosure. I have delibe1 ely re­
stricted this discussion to � ques­
tion of right and have a, ded all 
reference to any obligat, 1. My 
reason for doing so is n a con­
tention that obligation these 
cases can never be verilk Rather 
it is a conviction that w rarely 
in medical practice will doctor 
encounter a situation in · ich, be­
yond shadow of all Jitimate 
doubt, he must under r. 1 of sin 
reveal professional kn :l edge. 
And until all reasonabl ,ioubt to 
the contrary is dispellec! ,o one is 
justiiied in insisting tha. medical 
secret must be revealed. oral per­
missibility ( "may do") consist­
ent with legitimate dif ences of 
theological opinion; bu: 1oral ob­
ligation ("must do" ) not. In 
this particular matter tl e are too 
many imponderables t make it 
frequently possible in ractice to 
exclude all legitimate de •t. There­
fore, in what is meant I be a pre­
dominantly practical C: · -:ussion, I 
prefer to transmit the ·uestion of 
obligation as it affects iisclosures. 
If doctors ever should ( :1counter a 
case in which they feel conscience­
bound and yet relucta,1t to reveal 
a medical secret, they would do 
well to propose their problem to a 
competent theologian and be 
guided by his considered opinion. 
The basic reason behind this 
caution is again the fact that the 
common good is ultra-sensitive to 
any revelation of professional se­
crets. Even legitimate disclosures 
have to be regretted to some ex­
tent, because together with the 
good which they accomplish there 
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is always the danger that the in­
tegrity of the profession will suffer 
in public estimation. Unless the 
good to be achieved is proportion­
ate to concomitant harmful effects, 
and unless no other  practical 
means is available to attain that 
necessary good, secrecy should 
be maintained. As difficult as it is 
to cite practical cases in which a 
doctor would be permitted to re­
veal a medical secret. it is immeas­
urably more difficult to prove in­
stances in which he is certainly 
obliged to make such a revelation. 
THE SURVEY CASES 
On the basis of all that has pre­
ceded, my own opinion on the two 
other cases proposed to the English 
and Welsh doctors would favor 
the physician's maintaining secrecy 
in both. The most to be achieved 
if the doctor reports the abortion­
ist is the possible apprehension and 
prosecution of ·one criminal. but 
unfortunately not the extirpation 
of the criminal practice. And if 
conviction should depend primari­
ly on the doctor's evidence, the 
chances of effecting even that re­
sult are poor, since he can provide 
only hearsay evidence from a hos­
tile witness. If the doctor identifies 
his patient in order that she be 
forced to testify, he is violating her 
right to reputation, which is still 
txtant despite her moral guilt in 
Procuring abortion. It seems to me 
that too little good and too much 
harm would actually result from 
rtvelation in this case, and that the 
doctor is still obliged to secrecy. 
In the insurance case,s the pa­
tient is clearly making an unjust 
clai
Bu
·m under the terms of his policy. 
t the company has or had at its 
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disposal, and apparently failed to 
use. a very ordinary and acceptable 
means of protecting itself against 
such an eventuality, viz .. medical 
examination by its own physician 
prior to issuing the policy. The 
patient's personal physician has no 
obligation to the insurance com­
pany in these circumstances. If by 
his silence an injustice is made 
possible, it is one which, as far as 
the doctor is concerned, he permits 
because of a higher necessity and 
does not directly intend. And that 
injustice which is allowed does not 
seem comparable in significance to 
the harm which would be inflicted 
on the whole profession and on the 
common good {£ this type of reve­
lation were generally permitted. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Natural law obliges the doctor 
to silence with regard to the secrets 
in which he shares by virtue of his 
professional calling. This grave 
obligation derives from both com­
mutative justice ( which determines 
the rights of individual patients) 
and from legal justice ( which 
specifies the right which society 
exercises over the silence of doc­
tors). Because the rights of pa­
tients in this regard are not un­
limited, and because the common 
good can at times be adequately 
served only by some disclosure of 
the medical secret. the natural law 
obligation of medical secrecy is not 
s As proposed to the British physicians, 
the case presents the State as the In­
suring agent. In order to make the 
problem more practical for American 
doctors, I am assuming a situation more 
common in this country and supposing 
a case In which private Industry makes 
i ts  own provisions for employee acci­
dent Insurance. 
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absolute anci does admit of legiti­
mate exception. By the very nature 
of things, these exceptions should 
in the practical order be most rare, 
and require most careful consid­
eration in each individual case. 
It was in reference to an even 
more sacred secrecy ( one which 
admits of no conceivable excep-
tion) that St. Augustine 
to say: "I know less a} 
things which I hear in co 
than I know of those thin 
which I know nothing." I 
same rule, then one quit 
should characterize the 
habitual attitude towards : 
cal secret. 
d this 
it the 
ession 
about 
10t the 
similar 
octor's 
medi-
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CAPACITY FOR CONCERN* 
FRED M. TAYLOR, M.D. 
HOUSTON, TEXAS 
Your Excellencies, Archbishop 
Vehr and Bishop Maloney; Right 
Reverend Monsignor McGowan; 
Reverend Fathers; Drs. Murphy 
and Holoubek; Mr. Chairman; la­
dies and gentlemen: 
On behalf of the National Fed­
eration of Catholic Physicians' 
Guilds, as Chairman of the Award 
Committee and on the occasion 
also as a junior pediatrician, I am 
privileged to honor as Catholic 
Physician-of-the-Year, 1961, an 
elder physician and a senior pe­
diatrician, Dr. Norman M. Mac­
Neill of Philadelphia. 
Before I make the award I 
should like, first, to say that Dr. 
MacNeill was nominated by the 
St. Rene Goupil and St. Francis 
of Assisi Guilds of Philadelphia, 
and second, to relate to you some­
thing about this physician gentle­
man. He is a native of one of 
Canada's M a r i t i m e  Provinces. 
Nova Scotia, a part of the conti­
nent noted for an unusually high 
ratio of advanced educational fa­
cilities to population and for an 
especially valuable export: brain­
power. Dr. MacNeill was born in 
Antigonish, which on the province 
is eastward and north of the land 
of the Acadians of Longfellow's 
famous poem, Ev?ngeline. 
;---�ddress honoring the Catholic Phy-
11c1an of the Year, December l. t 96 l. 
Annual Winter Meeting, National Fed-
Tb
eration of Catholic Physicians' Guilds. 
,
.._ 
e Brown Palace Hotel, Denver, 
'-<>lorado. 
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At Antigonish Dr. MacNeill at­
tended St. Francis Xavier Univer­
sity. Afterwards he e x  p o r t e d 
himself to the States, and grad­
uated in m e d i c i n  e from the 
Jefferson Medical College in Phil­
adelphia. He served the Medical 
Corps of the Royal Canadian 
Army in World War I. became a 
charter member of the British Of­
ficers' Club ( often not to the 
delight of the Irish in Phildelphia), 
and later one of the club's presi­
dents. 
Dr. MacNeill is a Fellow of the 
Academy of Pediatrics. In Phila­
delphia he engaged in the practic·e 
of pediatrics, and in successive 
clinical academic appointments at­
tained his present faculty position, 
Clinical Professor of Pediatrics 
and Attending Pediatrician at the 
Jefferson Medical College and 
Hospital. Since 1921 in the Clinics 
for Children at Jefferson College 
and Hospital he has taught child 
health to countless students in 
medicine and nursing, and to 
countless parents as well. He is 
a member of the medical staffs of 
Germantown, Holy Redeemer and 
Nazareth Hospitals. At Jefferson 
Hospital a nurses' guild is 'named 
not in honor of a Quaker woman 
but in honor of a Catholic man 
from the province of New Scot­
land, thus the MacNeill Nurses' 
Guild at Jefferson. 
As a pediatrician, his profession­
al responsibility has been the care 
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